The Fall of Propaganda: Iran’s Hijab Protests
What do university and school protests tell us about the Islamic Republic’s propaganda?
After 40 days of protests initially ignited by the death of #Mahsa_amini, the 22-year-old Iranian girl who died in the custody of the morality police, the nationwide unrest is still persisting with no predictable patterns or organized leadership. Recent protests, since the 1979 revolution, mark the most significant challenge to the clerical leadership of the Islamic Republic. The Gen Z generation, with its strong presence of women, is bringing to the forefront the numerous strategic failures of the country’s official propaganda system. The effort is a monstrously ambitious project which has enjoyed unparalleled and wide-reaching support from all figures of the post-revolution presidency. In 2019, religious institutions had a share in the national budget 80 times higher in comparison to that allocated for environmental needs such as disaster relief. Propaganda in Iran is present in systems from kindergarten to universities, through official and semi-official organizations. The goal is to safeguard and continuously popularize the desired visions of the revolution by modifying textbooks, introducing approved historical narratives, and creating audio-visual material which is often co-opted by the state media and the press in service of the revolutionary ideals. Among these are the importance of Islamic ethics, and gendered roles and requirements, such as women having the hijab and being good mothers, and men being brothers and soldiers of the revolution. The failure of the official narrative and its continuous defeats in finding resonance with the youth culture in the absence of any competitors is old news among Iranians; however, all face-saving attempts and appeals to the contrary by the officials about their legitimacy and popularity, is crumbling much faster than many have thought.
Stuck in a Cycle of Mistakes
University students are not another group of protestors joining others in the protests. The response from the officials and the IRGC forces has not been different. They start by issuing warnings, ignoring and denying any requests for peaceful protests and gatherings, and eventually, they welcome the riot police and Basiji forces in universities. This strategy has led to numerous arrests and the kidnapping of key activists and students, often after a protest has concluded locally. It is another step in repeating the old mistakes which ignited the unrest, killing people as young as 12 and 17 years old. Given the huge financial resources and support of the state afforded to all religious institutions, and many related organizations working beside them for the past four decades, the expectations for a revolutionary loyal generation as venerated by the Islamic republic in ideals such as the late IRGC commander, Qasem Soleimani, is a clear sign of the deep-seated insecurities and weaknesses of the religious and political propaganda. The strict and hardliner mode of dress codes in public was no longer popular, but given the extent to which compulsory hijab and anti-clerical sentiments have been vocalized in these protests, one can understand just how deep this failure has been.
Seeing a Failed System: Schoolgirls and University Students in Iran
Young girls in schools are tearing the picture of Khomeini, the former supreme leader of the Islamic Republic, who issued the fatwas against Salman Rushdie and stood firmly behind an ultra-conservative, literalistic reading of Islam as codified in the theocracy’s legal system. Students as young as 12 and 14 years old are jumping and stomping on photos of Khamenei, as they appear on the very front page of all school textbooks. They take down the picture of the “great dear leader,” tear it apart, and write “Women, Life, Freedom” in its place before putting it back up for all to see. This last act of defiance is what is new. The clear, brave, and defiant “no” to the Islamic Republic’s way of life, of being a Muslim, of being a woman, and of being a human.
A few days ago, officials tried a dual approach to reconciliation. Pushing messages of tolerance and peaceful protest from the so-called reformist politicians (such as Khatami), and trying to regain public trust and slow the momentum of the protests by reaching out for what they think is the ideal solution out – dialogue. This sudden open arms to discussion and dialogue soon proved to be another repressive strategy. In times when the status quo is being threatened, civility and respect are demanded to keep things from changing. Imagine forcing a nation into 40 years of repression, incarceration, and arbitrary limitations, which predictably has resulted in extreme anger, and environmental and financial disaster, and then when the first signs of an alternative to the establishment narrative come to the scene, reverting to a call for civility and respect. The unseen and hidden part of this soft approach was the sharp increase in kidnappings and torture, and tightening of restrictions on activists, protestors and a wide range of artists, journalists and even very young students. When the official spokesperson of the regime visited different universities in hope of talking to students, chanting continued, with a lack of trust in former reformists and growing radical cynicism regarding the state media.
An Iranian student in the conservative city of Mashhad told me that they have turned off the TV “because those working for the state media live in another world where everything is fine and the west is to blame for their corruption and mistakes.” A parent and friend sent me a voice message from their young school girl, age 10, asking her parents why should she wear a hijab in school if others are not wearing it, and why are her friends are being taken away by the police when they are “good, nice and kind people who always had good grades.” She then pauses and says, “Will they kill me too? I don’t want to die now.” Angry and disheartened, the father says, “How can you even respond to that as a parent? She should be happy now with her friends not thinking about her death. I think I’ll join them tomorrow. I don’t want this future for my daughter.” Knowing full well about the use of firearms by state officials and non-stop reports of people being beaten to death on the streets, he has maintained his presence in all local protests ever since.
The video below shows an official urging the students to chant “down with USA!”, and instead of shouting the same, students chant “death to dictator”.
A Way Out? Conspiracies and Perpetual Gaslighting
When protests first made headlines in the local news, many were shocked by the younger generation of children and young university students. This generation knows how to utilize social media, has a good understanding of the English language, and understands a good deal about the contemporary world and culture through its interactions with the internet. These all provide alternative sources of news and information not contaminated by the Islamic Republic. The reaction to these protests on behalf of government officials and the Iranian government was infantilization. This reaction stems from the religious ideology of the clerics along with an active misinformation system formed and supported by the media in part through collaborations with public figures interested in conspiracy theories. The religious doctrine regards the populace as being in need of divine leadership. It is the survivor of the past monarchist state and has the responsibility of safeguarding Islam.
This mentality is infused with the end of the world and apocalyptic conspiracy theories by hardline Islamists such as Ali Akbar Raefipour and Hassan Abbasi, among others. Raefipour rose to prominence among public intellectuals by regurgitating and appropriating The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, internet anti-Semitic conspiracy theories, and apocalyptic principles of Shia Islam such as the eventual rise of the 12th Imam Mahdi believed by Twelver Shia to be the final savior of the mankind (an Islamic version of the second coming). Hassan Abbasi is a former revolutionary guard officer who endorses conspiracy theories more local to the MENA region. The type of theocracy in Iran is heavily reliant on bureaucracy and institutions, and it should not come as a surprise that Abbasi and Raefipour both lead some forms of “think tanks.” These institutions work by connecting forms of anti-freemasonry conspiracies with some revisionist elements of the history of Zionism. The goal is to create a sort of narrative that not only demonizes the right set of ideological enemies of the Islamic Republic (such as Israel, the US, and Saudi Arabia) but also connects these to religious themes of loyalty to the supreme leader as the rightful ruler before the apocalypse happens. This last ideological incentive is where religious ideology and connections to 8 years of Iran-Iraq war come into play for masking everything that is perceived as anti-Islamic, as also Satanic, Zionistic, atheistic, or politically motivated anti-Shiaism.
The misinformation keeps the narrative unfalsifiable while the ideology keeps the urgency of action alive to be used just in times of need (such as the crackdown on dissidents, falsifying stories about reformers, or spreading elective quotes and other conspiracy theories online). After all, if you believe you can be resurrected as one of the 313 soldiers of the 12th Imam in the final days of the universe, why would you disagree with the supreme leader or opt-out of opening fire on your friends and fellow countrymen and women? In their eyes, this is not what some guy as the supreme leader wants, this is just what god wants. In their eyes, all historians, scientists, philosophers, and every person not adhering to this doctrine, is either corrupt or a sinner, hence, keeping the process of othering is a form of loyalty to the regime and religion. A leaked voice call from a member of the riot police forces shows how the ideology is put into practice. The caller, referring back to the 8 years of the Iran-Iraq war, states that “even we felt the danger really, those who were going were saying goodbye to each other as they were leaving, just like the war (referring back to the 8 years of the Iran and Iraq war).” Recalling the time when they were preparing for battle against the Iraqi forces behind the trenches and finding them comparable to killing innocent people and children in the streets.
After the 2009 protests, most so-called reformists in the political sphere of Iran were marginalized. This process has more recently reached the likes of Rouhani and Zarif, the former Foreign Minister. The reformers have also been in the losing seat for quite a while. Away from the younger generation and unaware of their lives, goals, and even favorite genres of music, they call for peaceful protests and reform from within the system. A promise by a political party that has consistently failed to deliver any long-lasting results. The intellectual situation in Iran has a hard and rigid framework, which is the theocracy as imagined by Khomeini, Hussein-Ali Montazeri, and other revolutionary figures before and after the 1979 revolution. Inside this framework, there is a narrow field open to debate, and this is where the old-favorite reformers have always lived. This is done in order “to strictly limit the spectrum of acceptable opinion, but allow very lively debate within that spectrum — even encourage the more critical and dissident views. That gives people the sense that there's free thinking going on, while all the time the presuppositions of the system are being reinforced by the limits put on the range of the debate.”
The end product of this system is public reactions by the state officials which are far too removed for the existing generation to understand. They either confirm the lack of awareness perceived by the general population, or they attempt to utilize the old 1979 narratives, which proved useful in combating the previous monarchy and its influence. The situation is so drastically different today that people in general, and the younger generation in particular, do not feel connected to any of its elements. Mohammad Ali Ale-Hashem, appointed by the supreme leader Khamenei as the Imam of Friday Prayer in Tabriz, believes “enemies … are making it seem like we are being cruel to women in Iran.” Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, the current Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iran, was also among the very first officials reacting to huge waves of initial protests by saying that “[t]hose who are terrorists and rioters are different. No protestors have been arrested in Iran.”. This is the aforementioned process of othering at work. By definition, anyone opposed to the system is not from the people and is not just a journalist or a lawyer, or an activist. Instead, they are threatening the loyalty of the state and are simply terrorists, be it 10 year-old school girls or Amirsalar Davoudi, the human rights lawyer who is in prison. Another commentator, as part of the faculty of Imam Hussein University, posted the following for his analysis of the situation: “in west, they are using women as slaves and they dress them up as animals and have them on a leash.” If all of these seem extremely far-fetched and unbelievable to you, you are not alone. This is exactly the type of reaction that Iranians have, and indeed the reason why so many are not watching the state tv media anymore. When the 15-year-old Asra Panahi was beaten to death in a school raid for refusing to sing a pro-regime anthem, the cleric parliamentarian Kazem Musavi complained about fake news and said, “to hell with Asra Panahi’s death [all of this] because she has taken pills and passed away.” Statements such as these are simply aimed at gaslighting and abusing the protestors. In another post, I will write separately about how this technique has always been used, during interrogation especially, as a form of weaponizing shame and sexual assault on women prisoners.
Infantilization of women
Other reactions are simply attempting infantilization. On the one hand, this is not new when it comes to misogyny in Iran or other countries. On the other hand, the reason this type of reaction has figured so prominently among the officials and clerics is the need to remove any sort of autonomy and independence of thought for women, as these tend to grow the official party line – that they are being paid by the US, the UK or Israel intelligence services. The infantilization of the protestors, and especially women, is meant to undercut any sort of independent and homegrown motivation for human rights since, given the conspiratorial nature of the regime, the very existence of this is inconceivable. People who seek rights are seen either as agents of corruption or as psychologically defective. This leads us to the initial reactions when students at the Sharif University of Technology were violently beaten and arrested after they participated in protests on the university campus. Pointing to student protests, the head of Shahid Beheshti University, Sadollah Nasiri Gheidari, threatened students with admission for psychiatric intervention. Another cleric, as part of an institution close to the morality police, blamed the protests on video games, saying that “exciting games were designed for teenagers to bring them in the field for such a day. Teenagers see the perfect space to put the actions they perform in video games, into practice in the real field.” Another cleric, a representative of the supreme leader in Kashan, believed the solution to be “the problem of marriage” and that “the youth need halal [religiously permitted] fun and public sports. Pomegranate festivals and rosewater, but these haram [religiously banned] plans should not be among them.” More recently, a video has appeared (see below) showing a couple of police officers around 2 a.m. who are belittling and questioning young girls about their hijabs and arresting them for daring to use graffiti to express their protests, either by using the portrait of one of the female victims of the morality police or simply by writing “Life, Women, Freedom” (a key phrase of the protests).
Something has to give
Iran’s economy is witnessing its worst ever conditions since the 1979 Islamic revolution. Given the situation with the internet blackout and heavy blanket bans on social media, along with the more recent addition of Instagram restrictions, many small and medium-sized businesses are suffering, and some factories that rely on networks have reported problems in their operations, and this has been a continuous disaster for about a month now. The regime is not willing to flinch either in its misogyny or its political or legal strategy and is simply refusing to concede any ground. Looking at the monarchy before them, they see any move toward reconciliation and reform as a defeat for themselves and their religion. On the other hand, people are far too angry to give up, and every time the situation seems to be cooling down, the police or the security forces of IRGC end up killing or raiding another place. This effectively restarts the public protests again. One thing is clear, women have paid a far heavier price under this regime, and people in general have grown bitter and resentful of empty promises and conspiracy justifications. Something has to give, and the short-term suffocation of human rights, as evident from more recent protests, is not a promising approach to achieving a stable future because these protests need to be addressed, and yet, the Islamic Republic cannot cover the full territory of the public demands under its restrictive theocracy. One thing is for certain, we are witnessing the deconstruction and the fall of a propaganda system that took the Islamic Republic four decades to build in a series of confused and regressive policies.